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Introduction 
"Experience has shown that political insr.imtions ofren do not 
maimain stable prices. They have several powerful incentives to 
expand <he money supply beyond rhe rare of real growrh in rhe 
economy. In non.democrark sociecies. the comrol of the money 
supply is an imponanr insuumem of economic policy that can 
address various political needs. most notoriously che financing of 
govemmem needs. lr is againsr chis background char indepen-
dent central banks find cheir contemporary justification: central 
bank independence is conceived a~ a means to achieve the goal 
of price stabiliry. Cemral bank independence has been rhe pre· 
ferred instirucional arrangement ro promote monetary stability 
since <he end of rhe 1980s and beginning of rhe 1990s. A num· 
her of factors have contributed to chi~ developmenr." 1 
- Rosa Maria Lastra, I..gnl Foundtttions of lmm111tional 
Finnnrittl p~<tbilityI 2006 
H ow Independent Are Highly Independent 
Central Banks? 
Theories that appear co suggest char absolute independence exi~lp (i.e., 
"rhe theory char recogni'Zes no limits on cem.raJ bank independence. so 
long a~ the bank itself i~ reliably pre-committed co achieving price sea· 
biliry"2). indeed, cannot be susrainable. 
A sufficient and appropriare degree of cenual bank independence is 
definirely necessary for rhe goal of achieving price srabiliry. However. 
despire rhe levels of independence claimed co be enjoyed by several cen-
traJ banks~ recem events indicate shifts in focus of monetary policy 
objectives by various central banks, norably, char of rhe Fed Reserve. 
The impact of political and government influences on central bankK~D 
monetary policies has been evidenced from che recent financial crisis 
and in several jurisdicrions. Many cemral banks have adjusred monemry 
policies having been influenced by politictl pressures mat have builr up 
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as: a resulr of recenc financial and sovereign debr crises. However, such 
lack of absoluce independence (from political spheres) could prove 
symbiotic, in the sense char, despice the need for a cenain degree of 
ir~dependence from political imerferen.ce, cercain evencs which are 
capable of devaSlacing consequences, namely, a drastic disrupcion of the 
sysrem"s financial srabilicy, need to be responded to as quickly and 
prompdy as possible. Is ic possible for a cemral bank wim absoluce 
independence co operate effectively, particularly, given the close links 
between many central banks and cheir Treasury in several counuies? 
lc may be inferred dm cemral banks' crucial roles in esctblishing a 
macroprudemial framework provide che key co bridging che gap 
between macroeconomic policy and che regularion of individual finan· 
cia) insrirurions. This however, on irs own, is insufficient-close collab-
or.arion and effeccive information sharing becween cencral banks and 
regulatory auchoricies is paramount. 
Consequences of lack of dose collaboration, coordinarion~ and 
cimely exchange of informacion between criparrite auchoriries, such as 
the relacionship which exisrs between the United Kingdom's Financial 
Services Auchoricy (FSA), me Bank of England, and che Treasury, were 
wjcnessed during me Nonhero Rock Crisis. The Bank of England could 
nor effeccively perform irs rradicional role as lender of lasr resorc for a 
limited cime without such a role being made public. 
ll>e need for che escablishmem of "bridge banks" and special 
resolucion regimes (SRRs) has also been acknowledged in various 
jurisdictions. Hence, whilsr a cenain degree of independence from polit· 
ical interference is necessary, as well as an affirmation of the 
commicmenc to monetary policy objectives~ absolute independence 
could also result in a process whereby the necessary coordination 
re:quired becween regulatory and governmenc authorities exacerbate pr()oo 
blems which they (the authorities) were designed to solve. 
Here, Rosa M. Lastra's observation does appear to be manifesting 
icself ever increasingly: 
Perhaps in the cwemy.firsc cenrury we shall wimess the emer· 
gence of a rebalanced framework of macroeconomic policy (wich 
fiscal policy regaining pare of ics earlier role) mac may lead co a 
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realignmenc of <he goals <0 be pursued by <he monewy aud>ori-
des, which in rum will lead ro a new wave of legal reforms. 
Orher consequences of the recenr financial crisis include increased 
implememarion of fiscal policy mea~ures-in respect of caxing and 
spending activities [which are diS<inguished from proposals rela<ing <o 
quamhative ea~ing measures (an inAarionary policy measure)-in 
respee< of <he need <o address the Eurozone sovereign debr crises]. 
As regards rhe implememarion of fiscal policy mea~uresI camion is 
to be had to the implementation of fiscaJ measures which are such char 
whilsr rhey generate corrective e.ffecrs. chey do nor impede rhe prospects 
of growth and devdopmem of <he economy. 
Even chough rhe Fed Reserve is nor involved in determining fiscal 
policy measure.< (me Congress and <he Adminimation being responsible 
for <his), fiscal policy measures impact <he Fed's monetary policy deci-
sions. The indirea effect of fiscal policy on <he conduct of monemry 
policy through i<S inftuence on <he aggrega<e economy and the eco-
nomic ourlook and me impact of fedetal [aJ( and spending programs on 
rhe Fed Reserve's key macroeconomic objectives-maximum employ· 
mem and price scabilicy and "in making appropriate adjusrmenrs to i£S 
monetary policy rools"- is norable in several sicuacions and instances. 
Hence, how independem is che Fed really from governmem and fis. 
cal policy inftuences' Could i< no< be said d>at d>e governmem really 
has a duaJ role in fiscaJ and mone[ary policy serring? As indicated ini· 
tially, an appropriately and sufficiendy independent centtal bank has a 
cruciaJ role in ensuring price stabiliry objectives. 
The following remark highligll<S <he level of impac< as well as <he 
influence of political pressures on [he Fed's monecary policy objecdves: 
... for sevetal decades, a generally he.al<hy monewy policy balance 
produced good resui<S. The Fed's focus has shifted dr.uruuically <0 
[he shorr·run objective of lowering unemploymem and recendy 
[he willingness to (cemporarily?) sec aside its inflation target.3 
In view of such political interference, would it be wise co rhrust 
more powers into <he hands of the Fed Reserve, nan>ely, mrough a 
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widening of its scope of powers since dle executive (Government), as 
well as Congress. have a degree of influence over the decision~making 
capacities of the Fed Reserve. Further, and addressing the issue indepen· 
denrly of political influences on the Fed Reserve, would it really be in 
the interest of accounmbility to delegate more powers to an already rela· 
tively powerful Fed Reserve? 
Recent changes in the delegation of supervisory responsibilities in 
the United Kingdom, namely the transfer of bank supervision from 
the FSA back to the Bank of England, and the resulting increased 
scope of the Bank of England's powers, would appear to suggest that 
in certain cases, regulacory bodies as well as central banks should 
assume greater functions in certain capacities. Accordingly, jurisdiction 
specific cases have to be viewed individually and based on prevailing 
circumstances. 
Hence, ensuring that absolute independence is achieved, in respect 
of cenuaJ bank financial independence, constirmes a difficult task. Is it 
possible for a central bank to operate effectively-given the presence of 
absolute independence? CJose collaboration and exchange of informa# 
tion between the rripanire authorities in the United Kingdom (the FSA, 
the T reasury, and the Bank of England), as highlighted by the Nonhero 
Rock Crisis, if effective as it should have been, could have helped, nor 
only in identifYing the problems which existed at Northern Rock, bur 
more imporrandy, facilitated timely imervention which would have 
averred the scale of the crisis. 
Crisis f.tced by IKB, Landesbanken, and Hypo Real Estates nor only 
revealed an absence of an SRR for banks, bur also raised the issue of 
optimal measures which could be implemented to control (in part) pri-
vately owned bur publicly sponsored or (in pan) publicly owned finan-
cial enterprises.'' 
Jurisdictional Approaches to Central Bank 
Independen ce and Mon etary P olicy 
Mervyn IGng's reference5 to central bank independence in the United 
Kingdom highlights the importance being accredited to the ever increas-
ing and significant role of monetary policy. He adds: ~eow much 
